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Note

Marital Litigation: Impact of Title
III of Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968
United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
19681 has had an unpredictable influence upon domestic relations
litigation.2 Title III regulates the ability to intercept and disclose
the contents of wire or oral communications. 3 It provides not only
1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, ch. 119, § 802, 82 Stat.
112 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)).
2. See United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir.
1976); United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1976); White v. Weiss, 535
F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Markham v.
Markham, 265 So.2d 59 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1972), aj'd,272 So.2d 813 (Fla.
1973); In re Marriage of Lopp, - Ind. -, 378 N.E.2d 414 (1978); Berk v. Berk, 95
Misc.2d 33, 406 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1978); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373,
226 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
3. 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a)(c) and (d) (1976):
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or
oral communication;
(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing
or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection; or
(d) willfully uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any
wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a
wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
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for criminal penalties, 4 but also for civil damages, 5 and prohibits
admitting into evidence the fruits of illegal wire or oral interceptions.6
On various occasions, in response to claims by aggrieved partners, spouses who violated the plain language of Title El have
asked the courts to imply an interspousal immunity from the penalties imposed by the statute. Differing views have been expressed
by the circuit courts of appeal and state courts as to the existence
of such an implied interspousal immunity. This note will discuss
how the courts have viewed the purpose Congress sought to
achieve in enacting Title I and the implications of these decisions
on domestic relations disputes.
In United States v. Rizzo, 7 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of defendant, a licensed private investigator in Illinois, on thirteen counts of knowingly and unlawfully intercepting communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Rizzo
was employed by persons to gather information in regard to suspected marital infidelities.8 During the course of his employment,
Rizzo installed, or was assisted by the client-spouse in installing,
electronic eavesdropping equipment in the home where one of the
spouses resided or where both were residing together.9 The interceptions occurred with the knowledge and consent of the clientspouse. In his defense, Rizzo maintained that 18 U.S.C. § 2511 was
inapplicable to electronic eavesdropping by spouses within the
marital home 10 and that derivatively, the private investigator
shares the interspousal immunity of his client.
The court held that nothing in the legislative history of Title III
suggested that its sanctions were not intended by Congress to
cover third parties and in particular, private investigators." However, the interesting aspect of the Rizzo opinion is the court's willingness to acquiesce in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's
interpretation of Title II in Simpson v. Simpson.'2
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976).
583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978).
Brief for Appellee at 3-13, United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978).
Brief for Appellant at 20-27, United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978).
For example, Rizzo connected transmitting devices on telephone lines, in
laundry rooms and in closets in close proximity to a telephone. At times,
Rizzo did not do the actual installation himself, but gave instructions to the
client on proper installation. Id.
10. 583 F.2d at 908.
11. Id. at 910.
12. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
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SIMPSON AND ITS PROGENY

In Simpson, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals faced the issue
of whether use of electronic wiretapping equipment by the husband to intercept his wife's conversations with a third party from a
telephone in the marital home was an indictable offense under Title 111.13 The husband, entertaining suspicions as to his wife's
faithfulness, attached a wiretapping device to phone lines within
his home. He thereby intercepted "mildly compromising" conversations between his wife and another man. The husband-appellee
disclosed the contents of the tape recordings to neighbors, family
members, and his lawyer. Upon the advice of his lawyer, the wife
agreed not to contest a divorce action. However the wife did initiate a civil action for damages stemming from these disclosures
pursuant to section 2520,14 but the court held that this section was
inapplicable: "The naked language of Title III, by virtue of its inclusiveness, reaches this case. However, we are of the opinion that
Congress did not intend such a far-reaching result, one extending
into areas normally 5left to states, those of the marital home and
domestic conflicts."'
The court did indicate that they were not without doubts about
the result they had reached and limited the holding to the facts of
the case. However, not all courts faced with a similar issue have
heeded this caveat. Thus, Simpson has been relied upon to
demonstrate the existence of an implied interspousal immunity
from the provisions of Title HI.
Three years after Simpson, the Second Circuit, in Anonymous
v. Anonymous,16 ruled that "mere marital disputes.., do not rise
to the level of criminal conduct intended to be covered by the fed-17 The wife sued her former husband
eral wiretap statutes ....
13. Id. at 804.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976):
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause
of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or
procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages
computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or
$1,000, whichever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization
shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action
brought under this chapter or under any other law.
15. 490 F.2d at 805.
16. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
17. Id. at 677.
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for civil damages on the basis of recordings taken from an automatic telephone answering machine in the husband's home. The
tapes included her conversations with the couple's daughter, who
at the time was in the custody of the husband. Although the
boundaries remain undefined, Anonymous seems to suggest that
electronic surveillance is permissible in the context of marital litigation.
The use of tape recordings of telephone conversations between
a mother and her children was also the subject of a recent decision
in a New York state court. In Berk v. Berk,18 a child custody action,
the court refused to condone the conduct of the father in taping the
conversations, but at the same time held the recordings admissible
as evidence in a custody determination:
[W] here custody is a paramount issue, the Court should consider the best
interests of the children and, therefore, would want all of the information
available to better assist the Court in making a determination....
[W] here the custody of a child is at issue the strict rules of evidence need
not be followed. 19

Irrespective of the statement in Berk that the holding of the
court should not be construed as supporting the use of wiretapping, the legal effect of the decision will be to open the doors to
surveillance and invasion of privacy in a growing number of cases.
In a divorce and child custody proceeding similar to Berk, the
Ohio Court of Common Pleas in Beaber v. Beaber20 determined
that evidence consisting of recorded telephone conversations between the wife and her paramour was admissible to impeach the
wife's testimony. However, the factual circumstances of Beaber
indicate a more significant intrusion than that which occurred in
Berk, as Beaber involved not only the intrusion by the spouse, but
also that of a third party.' A detective agency which Mr. Beaber
had employed to follow his wife provided electronic equipment
and instructions to the husband so that he could tap the phone in
the marital home. The intercepted conversations included those
between the wife and children, as well as communications between the wife and an intimate acquaintance.
The Simpson doctrine was further extended in London v.
London. 21 The court dismissed, for failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted, the complaint of a wife against her
18. 95 Misc.2d 33, 406 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1978).
19. Id. at 34, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
20. 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974). The court stated that "[t]o deny admission of these tapes would be to deny the defendant [husband] the only
material, creditable evidence that he was able to obtain." Id. at 103-104, 322
N.E.2d at 915.
21. 420 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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former husband for interception of conversations between the wife
and her daughter. In the language of the court:
The Court finds no significance in the fact that in Simpson the interception and recording took place in the marital home of the parties, whereas
here it took place in the husband and children's home from which his wife
had departed. What is important is that the locus in quo of the interception be a family home ....
There is no apparent reason to distinguish
between the interception of telephone
calls in a marital home and inter22
ception in a parent-progeny home.

Thus, in London, the court took a step beyond any prior precedent which followed the Simpson doctrine. The court expressly
extended the permissible area of interception beyond the marital
home. Since London was an action for civil damages, as opposed
to an action for child custody, the court did not attempt to justify
its adoption of the interspousal immunity as being in the "best interests of the children. ' 23 Interestingly, the courts deciding
London, Beaber, and Anonymous did not make an independent
examination of the legislative history of Title III, but rather accepted the interpretation engrafted upon the statute by the Simpson court. Yet not all courts have construed Title M as did the
Simpson court.
The most complete deviation from the result in the Simpson
line of cases was effected by the Sixth Circuit. In United States v.
Jones,24 appellee Jones and his wife were not living together at the
time of the interceptions in question. Mrs. Jones had been granted
a restraining order to prohibit her husband from "coming about"
her. Jones continued to pay rent on their home and also paid the
telephone bills. On one occasion while babysitting, Jones placed a
recording device on the telephone because he was suspicious of
his wife's extramarital activities. The resultant recordings confirmed his suspicions, and Jones used The recordings to obtain a
divorce.
Jones was charged with intercepting and using the contents of
telephone conversations in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1) (a) and
(d).25 The indictment against Jones was dismissed by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. 26 The
court, relying on Simpson, ruled that Title M was not intended to
prohibit purely interspousal wiretaps placed on telephones in the
marital home.2 7 The Government appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
The court concluded that "18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (a) establishes a
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 946-47 (emphasis in original).
95 Misc.2d at 34, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
See note 3 supra.
542 F.2d at 663-64.
Id. at 663.
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broad prohibition on all private electronic surveillance and that a
principal area of congressional concern was electronic surveillance
for the purposes of marital litigation."28 The court, however, was
not satisfied to complete its opinion with this broad prohibitory
language. It went further to compromise its position by stating
that "[elven if Simpson was correctly decided on its facts, this
case is clearly distinguishable. 2 9 Jones thereafter was distinguished from Simpson because appellee Jones was indicted for a
criminal rather than civil offense and because Jones's surveillance
30
took place outside the marital home.
Other courts have been cautious in distinguishing Simpson factually rather than attacking the Fifth Circuit's rationale. In Remington v. Remington,31 for instance, the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed the question of
whether the doctrine of interspousal immunity barred the plaintiffhusband from success in an action against his wife pursuant to
section 2520.32 In deciding that Remington could recover damages
from his wife, the court distinguished Simpson by stating that in
this case, a private detective agency and a third party were involved in the installation of the wiretap. Additionally, the recordings were used by two law firms without the knowledge or consent
of the husband: "[T] he Court is unable to conclude as a matter of
law that the gross invasion of an individual's privacy by private
detective agencies, law firms and other unknown persons, whether
instigated by a spouse or not, is not included within the statutory
'3 3
proscription.
The serious nature of the invasion of privacy was also the concern of the Eighth Circuit in White v. Weiss.34 Weiss, a private
detective, furnished telephone wiretap recording equipment and
assisted in its installation, although the wife accomplished the actual installation. For three and one-half months all incoming and
outgoing calls were monitored, 35 some of these being disclosed to
the detective agency. The Eighth Circuit found "no sound rationale or legal basis in the statute or in its legislative history to insulate a private detective from the reach of the civil penalties
28. Id. at 669.
29. Id. at 672.
30. Id. See also 4 N. Ky. L. REv. 389, 395-96 (1977).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
See note 3 supra.
Id. at 901.
535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1069. The wiretap intercepted and recorded Mr. White's conversations
not only with his lover, but also with his attorney, business associates and the
Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 1071.
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contained in the statute [Title III] ."36 The court found it immaterial that the defendant did not personally connect the surveillance
equipment, because Weiss accomplished the invasion of privacy
by furnishing the equipment and personally directing its installation.
In still another interpretation of the scope of Title III, the North
Carolina high court in Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker,37 considered
whether all evidence gathered as a result of the interception of
plaintiff's phone conversations by use of an extension was admissible at trial.38 The evidence obtained from the sound activated recorder placed on the extension phone in defendant's closet was
declared inadmissible. After examining the legislative history of
Title I, the court interpreted the provision in a manner conflicting
with that relied on in Simpson:
We do not agree with the 5th Circuit's patently doubtful conclusion that
the legislative history of the statutes under consideration shows no direct
indication that the statute was intended to reach domestic conflicts. The
history of the act indicates a legislative intent that individuals be protected3 9from invasions of their privacy by sophisticated surveillance devices.

Thus the North Carolina Supreme Court became one of few to
clearly state its dissatisfaction with the Simpson holding.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The purpose of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act
of 1968, as evidenced in Senate Report No. 1907, is to prohibit "all
wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly
authorized law enforcement officials engaged in the investigation
36. Id. at 1071.
37. 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
38. Pertinent here is the extension telephone exception to Title III found in 18
U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a) (i) (1976):
'Electronic, mechanical, or other device' means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication
other than(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user
by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its
business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary
course of its business ....
(emphasis added).
In Rickenbaker, § 2510(5) (a) (i) was found to be inapplicable because an
extension telephone used without authorization or consent to record private
conversations is not used in the ordinary course of business. 290 N.C. at 379,
226 S.E.2d at 350.
39. 209 N.C. at 381, 226 S.E.2d at 352.
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40
of specified types of major crimes after obtaining a court order."
The Report then enumerates four exceptions to the Act's broad
language, none of which are an exception based upon interspousal
immunity.4 1 Even the Simpson court conceded that the plain language of the Act clearly reaches the action of any person who 42intercepts or attempts to intercept wire or oral communications.
The Simpson court suggested that the failure to provide for an
interspousal electronic surveillance exception may be attributed
to a lack of awareness on the part of Congress of the far-reaching
implications of the broad language. 43 Such a suggestion fails to
take into account statements made by investigators at the Congressional hearings and statements by Congressmen made during
debate.
In 1965, Congress began its efforts to modernize the law of electronic surveillance. Congress took note that new technological developments made the use and abuse of electronic surveillance less
difficult, thus jeopardizing the privacy of all communication. The
Senate Judiciary Committee's report stated:

No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and
be left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital,
religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an un44
seen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage.

The Administrative Practice and Procedure Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee divided their hearings on electronic surveillance into six parts; four parts concerned government
surveillance, another considered the activities of telephone companies, and one part dealt with private use of electronic surveillance
40. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2112, at 2113.
41. Id. at 27-28, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 2112, at 2113. The
four exceptions include interceptions by: (1) employees of communications
facilities in the ordinary course of business; (2) employees of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) acting in the ordinary course of business; (3) government agents to protect the Nation against attack and (4) government agents to protect the "national security." Id.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976). "Person" is defined to mean any employee, or agent of
the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation. 18
U.S.C. § 2510(6) (1976). See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 805, for a discussion of the plain language of Title Ill.
[W] e are of the opinion that Congress did not intend such a far43.
reaching result, one extending into areas normally left to states,
those of the marital home and domestic conflicts. We reach this decision because Congress has not, in the statute, committee reports, legislative hearings, or reported debates indicated either its positive
intent to reach so far or an awareness that it might be doing so.
490 F.2d at 805.
44. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 40, at 67, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, at 2154.
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devices. Senator Long, Chairman of the subcommittee, was obviously cognizant of the use of private surveillance when he identified the three "large areas" of nongovernmental snooping as: (1)
industrial, (2) divorce cases, and (3) politics. 45 The legislative history also contained the personal views of Senators Dirksen,
Hruska, Scott and Thurmond. These senators concluded that a
"broad prohibition is imposed on private use of electronic surveillance, particularly in domestic relations and industrial espionage
situations. '46 Additionally, Richard Gerstein, the District Attorney
of Dade County, Florida, testified that "it is routine procedure in
marital disagreements and other civil disputes for private detective agencies, generally with full knowledge of the lawyers, to tap
telephones." 47
IV.

SUPREME COURT STANDARDS

The legislative history of Title III must also be viewed in light of
two Supreme Court decisions rendered the year prior to passage of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The Judiciary
Committee report explicitly states 48 that Title III conforms to the
standards set out in Berger v. New York, 49 and Katz v. United
States.50
Berger involved the constitutionality of a New York statute
which permitted the installation of a recording device upon oath or
affirmation of reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a
crime may be obtained. The Supreme Court was concerned with
the danger to the privacy of the individual and the constitutional
questions raised by the fourth and fifth amendments in the increasingly prevalent use of eavesdropping equipment. Although
Rizzo involved interceptions of communications in the private sector, the concerns that the Berger Court expressed due to the growing use of surveillance devices by law enforcement officers are
equally applicable in the privacy of one's home. In emphasizing
the importance of privacy, the Court decided that "it is not asking
45. Hearings on Invasion of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice&
Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 2261
(1965-1966).
46. IndividualViews Messrs. Dirksen,Hruska, Scott and Thurmond on Titles I, II
and III, quoted in S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 40, at 225, reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, at 2274.
47. Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice&
Procedure of the Senate JudiciaryComm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 1009
(1965-1966).
48. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 40, at 28, reprintedin [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, at 2113.
49. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
50. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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too much that officers be required to comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of
one's home or office are invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which
are greaterthan thatposed by the use of eavesdroppingdevices."51
The Court reaffirmed that a conversation was within fourth
amendment protections, and therefore the use of electronic devices to capture a conversation was a search within the meaning of
52
the amendment.
The underlying expectations of the person whose privacy was
invaded by the use of an electronic listening and recording device
were the primary concerns of the Court in Katz. 53 Similarly, these
notions are embodied in the statutory language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2), relating to oral communications. Oral communications
are defined as utterances "by a person exhibiting an expectation
that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation."' ' Ultimately, the question in both fourth amendment and Title I cases becomes
whether an individual has a justifiable expectation of privacy
within the confines of one's own home. Justice Harlan, concurring
in Katz, stated that "an enclosed telephone booth is an area where,
like a home,.., a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."55
Katz established that advance authorization by a neutral and
detached magistrate was a constitutionally required precondition
to the type of surveillance undertaken by the government officers. 56 This concept is fundamental when reassessing what Congress was considering when drafting and adopting Title I
following the Katz decision. In light of the rule in Katz, it is difficult to perceive that Congress would leave a wife or husband without any recourse when his or her privacy was invaded by a
suspicious spouse. The information revealed by spousal surveillance into alleged marital infidelities has effects on an individual's
life, potentially as severe as information acquired through surveillance by law enforcement officers.
Regarding the issue of federal pre-emption, in Anonymous v.
51. 388 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 51.
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz's end of a telephone conversation was overheard by
FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening'and recording device to
the outside of a public telephone booth. At trial, evidence of the conversation
was admitted and Kqtz was convicted of transmitting wagering information
across state lines. Id. at 348.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1976).
55. 389 U.S. at 360 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 359.
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Anonymous, 5 7 an action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511, the Second
Circuit inferred that it was unwilling to award damages under Title
III because a purely domestic conflict was a matter "clearly to be
handled by the state courts." 58 When examining the legislative
history of Title III, there is some evidence of Congressional reluctance to pre-empt state law:
Subparagraphs (c) and (d) [§ 2511] prohibit, in turn, the disclosure or
the use of the contents of any intercepted communication by any person
knowing or having reason to know the information was obtained through
an interception in violation
of this subsection .... There is no intent to
59
pre-empt state law.

However, in United States v. Marion,60 the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that the admissibility of information
obtained by eavesdropping must be judged according to the state
wiretap statute, rather than the more stringent federal statute.
The court stated that "whether the proceedings be federal or state,
interpretation of a state wiretap statute can never be controlling
where it might impose requirements less stringent than the controlling standard of Title III."161 Thus it appears that the courts
have not accepted less strict standards for wiretapping on the ba62
sis that state law is controlling.
V. ANALYSIS OF RIZZO
The intent of the Rizzo court was to avoid a conflict between the
interpretations given Title I in Jones and Simpson. The court did
so by relying on legislative history to the exclusion of relevant precedent. Based on an evaluation of the legislative history of Title
III, the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit that Rizzo's third party
intrusion into the marital home constituted a violation of section
2511 appears to be sound. When a third party intentionally listens
to conversations in violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy,
there is an interference with a right protected under Title I.63
However, in focusing entirely on the legislative history to the
exclusion of case law from other jurisdictions, the Rizzo court
57. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977). For an explanation of the factual circumstances of
the case, see text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
58. Id. at 679.
59. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 40, at 93, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEWS 2112, at 2181.
60. 535 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1976). See also People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 852, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1973) (state law on wiretapping pre-empted only if it conflicts with
or is more permissive than federal law).
61. 535 F.2d at 702.
62. For an analysis of state law regarding interspousal immunity in tort, see
Comment, InterspousalElectronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. ToL L. REV.
185, 190-97 (1975).
63. See note 3 supra.

19791

MARITAL LITIGATION

1191

omitted an important step in reasoning which would have provided
valuable insight into the future success or failure of suits by
spouses against their partners for wiretapping offenses. The court
concluded that the private investigator had no derivative spousal
electronic surveillance immunity without first deciding the intermediate question of whether there even exists electronic surveillance immunity in favor of the spouse from which an investigator's
immunity could derive.
The fundamental distinction between Rizzo and Simpson is
,that in Rizzo, the court was dealing with surveillance by a third
party, whereas in Simpson only the spouse was involved. This
would appear to be a sufficient difference to justify the contrary
results if there was fundamental agreement as to the underlying
rationale in the two cases. The Rizzo court sought to mask the underlying conflict by restating Simpson's dicta that a different view
would have been taken of "a third-party intrusion into the marital
home." 64
The core philosophy in Simpson was that personal surveillance
"is consistent with whatever expectations of privacy spouses
might have vis-a-vis each other within the marital home." 65 This is
in direct opposition to the language of Jones:
For purposes of the federal wiretap law, it makes no difference whether a
wiretap is placed on a telephone by a spouse or by a private detective in
the spouse's employ. The end result is the same-the privacy of the66unconsenting parties to the intercepted conversation has been invaded.

Perhaps if the Rizzo court would have analyzed Rizzo's surveillance from the perspective of an invasion of privacy, the legal community would have been given insight into the Seventh Circuit's
view of Title III as it relates to marital litigation. By focusing on
the right to privacy issue, it would have become apparent that
Jones and Simpson represent very different philosophies. Had it
done so, it could have selected one of these approaches and
weighed Rizzo's actions accordingly. Rather, what the court
achieved by evading the issue, is further confusion as to the applicability of Title III in marital litigation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The question remaining is whether the Rizzo decision forecloses any invocation of interspousal electronic surveillance immunity in the Seventh Circuit. At best, it can be said that the court
did nothing to close the door to future invocation of such interspousal immunity. The court assumed, "without deciding, that
64. 490 F.2d at 809.
65. Id.
66. 542 F.2d at 670.
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Simpson was correctly decided and yet affirm[ed] Rizzo's conviction.' ' 67 Although seemingly to concede that the facts of this case
demonstrated such disregard for the basic tenets of individual privacy that it was not a close case, the Rizzo court sensed some tension between its decision and Simpson.
A major problem caused by the court's assumption that Simpson was correctly decided is the impact of such an assumption on
the Justice Department's decision to prosecute interspousal electronic surveillance cases. In determining the practicality of prosecuting a case based on a wiretap by a spouse, the Justice
Department gives 68some credence to the attitude of the court toward such actions.
The fact that the Rizzo court expressly refused to choose be69
tween the interpretations given Title III in Simpson and Jones
vividly points out the need for a final judicial resolution of the marital surveillance issue. Such resolution is imperative to give the
Justice Department an indication of the current judicial attitude,
and importantly, to give each individual knowledge of the possible
limitations of his or her right to privacy.
Karen Reimer '80

67. 583 F.2d at 909.
68. See Comment, supra note 62, at 211 n.105.
69. 583 F.2d at 909.

